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Are collaborative robots safe? 
Abstract: Collaborative robots (cobots) market is 
supposed to increase rapidly. Although cobots are safer 
than their ancestors, industrial robots, there are some 
safety issues. The risk assessment for cobots is difficult 
since the cobots are working beside humans. In most of 
the applications the cobots can be safe. Sharp tools or 
objects and risk of impact to head are excluded from 
the common applications due to their risks. The 
common idea is to apply power and force limitation to 
ensure safe performance of cobots. The speed of the 
robot has huge effect on the impact force. Speed 
reduction with adequate safety controls can decrease 
the impact force to acceptable level in most of the 
applications. If there are severe risks in the robot cell, 
then it is possible to apply adequate separation 
distance between human and robot or safety-rated 
monitored stop to ensure safety and relatively close 
vicinity between human and the robot. One issue is that 
the stopping performance is complex and currently it is 
difficult to predict. Quite often, the validation requires 
impact force/pressure measurements or impact 
modelling.  
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1 Introduction 
Collaborative robots (cobots) have been under 
discussion for some years. They have some properties, 
which make it possible to work safely beside the robot. 
They are expected to open up new possibilities for 
flexibility, productivity and user friendliness. Also 
fenceless production cells are often mentioned.  
Currently the world market of cobots is about 600 
million € and at 2027 the market is supposed to be 7500 
million € [1]. Collaborative robots are typically small 
and their reach is usually below 1.3 m and due to the 
size, their applications are often related to handling of 
small size objects. However, new applications are 
expected to appear.  
The industrial robots are typically stronger, faster 
and more accurate than collaborative robots, but also 
cobots have some advantages. According to Kildal et al., 
the expectations of cobots are often fulfilled and in 
many cases, they are easier to program [2]. According 
to Bender et al., increased operational efficiency is the 
most frequent reason to choose a cobot. However, the 
payback time requirement for cobots is longer than for 
industrial robots. Very often cobots are evaluated by 
applying other than monetary terms. The most 
important values have been related to ergonomics, 
quality and flexibility. [3] 
One advantage of the collaborative robots is that, 
usually, they are easier to program and the robot 
workspace does not have as many objects as the 
workspace of an industrial robot. On the other hand, 
collaborative robots are used in applications, which 
change more often than industrial robot applications. 
Continuous changes make it challenging to maintain 
adequate level of safety. 
Although cobots are safer to use than industrial 
robots, according to Kildal et al. common opinion is that 
risk analysis is more difficult to make for cobots [2]. It 
can be understandable, since cobots are used in 
applications where human and robot are close to each 
other and it makes the risk assessment more difficult.  
One special difficulty is related to force limiting of 
cobots, since the validation of force limits is difficult 
and the impact effect depend on the situation and how 
a person feels an impact. According to measurements 
at VTT a change of a parameter, especially, speed has 
an effect on impact force. Also Kirchner et al. points out 
that a parameter change of the robot cause 
unpredictable impact forces for many collaborative 
robots. Measurements can reveal the impact forces [4]. 
The aspect how a person feels an impact is difficult 
since Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC) is partly 
dedicated to enable trade by declaring uniform safety 
requirements. From the trade point of view, there 
should be applicable safety limits. The aspect how a 
person feels an impact is related more to user 
organization and related requirements (Work 
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Equipment Directive 2009/104/EC).  
This text aims to point out factors, which need to be 
considered to estimate the safety of a collaborative 
robot. Many safety features have conditions, when 
their performance is adequate according to safety 
standards. Section 2 describes the collaboration of 
human and the robot. Section 3 points out safety 
requirements, which are important for cobots. Section 
4 points out safety issues and measures, which are 
important for cobots. Section 5 presents safety design 
process model for collaborative robots. The process 
model is focusing on impact hazards and related safety 
measures. The idea of the process model is to point out 
factors, which have remarkable effect on safety 
measures to be used. Section 6 shows remarks related 
to safety of cobots. 
 
2 Collaboration  
Collaboration between human and robot can be 
realized in many ways and the separation distance, 
collaborative workplace locations and applied forces 
can vary from one application to another. The safety of 
collaboration can be based on inherently safe 
structures, guards, sensors, motion control, safe 
procedures and functional safety. 
The ISO 10218-2 standard presents conceptual 
applications of collaborative robots, which are [5]: 
 Hand-over window. Autonomous operation, 
reduced speed near the window, fixed or sensitive 
guards 
 Interface window. Autonomous operation, except 
at the interface window the robot stops, fixed or 
sensitive guards, hold-to-run control. 
 Collaborative workspace. Autonomous operation, 
person detection system, reduced speed 
according to distance.  
 Inspection. Autonomous operation, person 
detection system or enabling device, reduced 
speed according to distance 
 Hand-guided robot. Moving by hand guiding, 
hold-to-run control, reduced speed according to 
distance. 
The above list does not show applications, which 
applies power and force limitation as a safety measure. 
Force limitation could be applied at any of the 
mentioned conceptual application and the 
collaborative workspace could allow more intensive 
collaboration.  
Aaltonen et al. present four levels of collaboration. 
Here are presented the levels and comments how 
separation and speed control, like the dynamic safety 
system can be related to the level. [6] 
 No coexistence: physical separation. 
 Coexistence: human works in (partially or 
completely) shared space with the robot with no 
shared goals. 
 Cooperation: human and robot work towards a 
shared goal in (partially or completely) shared 
space.  
 Collaboration: human and robot work 
simultaneously on a shared object in shared 
space. Physical contact is allowed, possibility for 
hand-guiding.  
The level of safety depends on the level of 
collaboration, due to the exposure time and separation 
distance. If there is no coexistence, the risk for a person 
is not so high since the person is not exposed to danger. 
It is more difficult to say the difference of the risk 
between the three other collaboration levels, although 
collaboration seems more risky due to obvious vicinity 
of the robot.  
 
3 Safety requirements  
Most of the collaborative robots are designed 
according to inherently safe principles. The 
collaborative robots are designed so that they should 
not exceed the defined force, at least with slow speed. 
In old robot safety standard (ISO 10218-1:2006) there 
has been a general force limit (150 N), but now the limit 
is specific for each body part of the human according to 
ISO TS 15066 [6]. The power and force limiting, brings 
new kind of thinking, since the contact is now a 
designed feature and not just a rare mishap. The 
designer needs to estimate, which body parts can be 
exposed to an impact of the robot and then limit forces 
accordingly.  
The collaborative operations apply at least one of 
the means: safety-rated monitored stop, hand-guiding, 
speed and separation monitoring or power and force 
limiting by inherent design or control. The means are 
described more at the section 4. 
One issue is that according to ISO 10218-2 section 
5.2.2 safety related parts of the robots must comply 
with PL d and Cat 3 requirements of ISO 13849-1 [7]. 
This is related, among others, to stop, speed, area, 
power and force control. Many of the current robots do 
not comply with the requirements and therefore one 
have to consider, can e.g. a speed limit be applied to 
guarantee safety.  
The ISO 13849-1 standard is related to functional 
safety of safety functions and associated control 
systems. The requirement levels are associated 
Performance Levels (PL) from “a” to “e” (highest level). 
There are both qualitative requirements, for example 
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associated to software, and quantitative requirement 
i.e. the average probability of dangerous failure per 
hour. For PL d the probability value have to be below 
10-6. The factures, which affect the calculation of 
average probability of dangerous failure per hour 
(PFHD) are: Mean Time to Dangerous Failure (MTTFD), 
designated architecture (Category) and Diagnostic 
Coverage (DC). In addition, Common Cause Failures 
(CCF) are considered, but only to fulfil adequate 
requirements, not to for calculation. The category 3 is 
associated to duplicated structure (two channel 
system, one-out-of-two, 1oo2, hardware fault 
tolerance = 1), which is able to reveal single dangerous 
failures, since the duplicating part can perform the 
safety function, if one channel fails. The category 2 has 
also redundancy, but instead of duplication, diagnostics 
and alarms are applied to ensure safety. The two-
channel system or failsafe (single fault safe) structure is 
considered more reliable than one-channel system with 
diagnostic, although the probability of dangerous 
failure per hour can be the same. The reason is that 
when applying two-channel system, the input data is 
not so sensitive to mistakes i.e. PL d can be achieved 
with lower MTTFD and DC values. 
Fig. 1 shows safety measures and related standards 
according to ISO 10218-2. The basic design is made 
according to ISO 12100 [10] and then guards, safety 
distances and protective devices are selected and 
designed according to the relevant requirements. 
 
Fig. 1. Safety measures and standards of ISO 10218-2. 
 
4 Safety issues and measures 
Collaborative robots can be safer than heavy industrial 
robots. However, the collaborative robots are used in 
applications, where human and robot are close to each 
other and there is a high probability of impact. The 
intention is that human and robot work together. If the 
robot has sharp or dangerous tools, then similar safety 
measures as applied in industrial robot cells, are 
required. The ISO 10218-1 [9] describe the safety 
measures to collaborative robots from which at least 
one measure must be chosen. The measures are: 
safety-rated monitored stop, hand-guiding, speed and 
separation monitoring and power and force limiting by 
inherent design or control.  
 
4.1 Safety-rated monitored stop 
The stopping of the robot is monitored continuously 
and unauthorized movement case protective stop, 
which cut the power from servomotors. Protective stop 
resembles emergency stop (which is initialized by a 
person) and it provides, typically, safe stopping 
performance, but restarting requires manual start-up. 
Safety-rated monitored stop does not require manual 
restart, if the start-up can be made safely and persons 
at the restricted area are detected. Some robots have 
requirements fulfilling internal monitoring system, but 
monitoring can be done also by applying external 
monitoring system.  
 
4.2 Hand-guiding 
The robot is operated by applying controls near the 
end-effector. The controls include also emergency stop 
and enabling device. The robot applies safety-rated 
monitored speed.  
 
4.3 Speed and separation monitoring 
The position of the robot and humans are measured 
and speed is controlled according to the separation 
distance. The separation distance is calculated 
according to ISO 13855 (or ISO TS 62046), takes into 
account: stopping time of the robot, delays related to 
detection, communication and action, human speed, 
human reach towards danger point and uncertainty 
related to accuracy [11]. The speed can be reduced 
down to zero to avoid impact hazard. The robot should 
have safety-rated monitored speed function in order to 
realize flexible solution. Without safety-rated 
monitored speed reduction the separation distance 
would be long, i.e. often over 3 m, depending on the 
stopping time.  
 
4.4 Power and force limiting by inherent design or 
control 
Some collaborative robots have power and force 
limiting, which is based on either lightweight 
construction and/or quick, requirements fulfilling 
impact detection and stopping. If the load is heavy, also 
speed reduction is needed to fulfil the allowed max. 
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force/pressure limits. The force limits of the robot are 
difficult to realize accurately, since so many factors 
affect the result (e.g. speed, axis, horizontal/vertical 
movement, load). Due to complexity of the robot 
stopping performance, measurements are currently 
the only way to verify the achieved force limits related 
to quasi-static impacts (clamping) [4]. Transient impact 
forces (open space) are difficult to measure and 
therefore the forces are verified by applying calculation 
model. An example model is presented at ISO TS 15066. 
In the model an average hand is applied and for smaller 
hand, transient force would be smaller than the model 
value, since due to smaller mass the impact is more 
flexible (recoil).  
In addition to the impact force limit values, there are 
also pressure limit values. Pressure values are difficult 
to measure and model, since it is difficult to estimate 
the effective impact area of the robot and the human. 
The impact area 1 cm2 gives roughly similar speed limit 
values as force limit calculations. Smaller impact area 
(sharp edge) can give very high pressure values and 
therefore very small speed limit values.  
 
4.5 Speed effect on impact force 
Speed reduction reduce effectively the impact forces 
caused by the robot. Fig. 2 shows how speed affect the 
impact force in transient fully inelastic collision to hand 
and chest according to calculation model. Fig. 2 shows 
also that an impact with similar force is achieved for 
hand with higher speed than for chest. This means that 
when fulfilling the force limit requirements an impact 
to hand may be done with higher speed than for chest. 
One may conclude also that higher speeds can be 
applied if an impact only to hands is relevant. The robot 
weight in the model is 100 kg (heavy robot) and load 10 
kg. Calculation is made by applying energy-based 
calculation model of ISO TS 15066 (equation A.5). In 
reality, some energy turns to heat and therefore the 
model gives a slightly pessimistic value. On the other 
hand, inelastic impact gives lower values than elastic 
impact, but partly elastic impact would be hard to 
calculate or compare to real impacts. The impact to 
hand is more flexible (reduced mass is small in the 
model) than to chest and therefore the force values for 
chest are higher at the same speed. For both hand and 
chest, the allowed limit force is 280 N (transient 
contact). The heavy 100 kg robot is chosen because the 
values are almost the same for heavier robots and 
therefore it represents a worst-case scenario. For 
smaller robots, the mass and load affect the model 
results strongly. Fig. 3 shows that the robot speed 2.6 
m/s or below cause acceptable impact force to the 
hand. For smaller robots, the speed value is a little bit 
higher. The maximum speed of cobots (tool centre 
point) is usually close to 1.5 m/s, depending on the 
applied tool. If the impact is to the chest then the speed 
need to be below 0.7 m/s. To fulfil the impact force 
requirements, reduced speed is required if a person is 
working so close to the robot that it could hit the 
human body.  
 
Fig. 2. Figure shows how similar transient impact force 
is achieved with higher speed for hand than for chest. 
 
4.6 Other safety measures and issues 
In addition, the mentioned obligatory measures, it is 
possible to use external tactile sensors or soft pads to 
meet the force limit requirements.  
One safety issue related to collaborative robots is 
that they are applied in applications, which change 
often. This means that also risk assessment should be 
made often and it may be difficult to find new risks, if 
only quick risk assessment is done.  
One aspect to be considered is that the robots may 
have exceptions to fulfil requirements. The robot 
system designer must check from the manual the 
conditions, when the robot can fulfil safety 
requirements. Following aspects are examples of 
conditions stated by manufacturer of the cobot:  
 some conditions may hinder detecting impacts 
(e.g. specific positions, slow speed),  
 there can be stopping performance parameters 
(e.g. stopping category and performance level) 
 high speed or force limits may cause different 
safety requirements (e.g. overriding),  
 control of singularity points may require 
additional tasks to maintain safety and  
 acceleration/deceleration parameters affect 
stopping performance (slower deceleration can 
increase impact force).  
One obvious issue is the applied tools. A sharp tool is 
usually dangerous and the robot work area may have 
corners or other machines, which cause potential 
hazard if human body part is clamped against it. In 
addition, grippers may be hazardous, but there are also 
models, which take into account the human presence.   
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5 Safe design process model for 
collaborative robots 
Safety design process for collaborative robots (Fig. 4) is 
part of machinery safety design process (see Fig. 3). 
According to the design process, first risk assessment is 
applied to find out, which parts of the machine need 
safety measures. Basically, risk assessment is required 
to identify risks. Risk identification is made by applying, 
usually, hazard list of ISO 10218-2. The next phase risk 
estimation can be made according to harmonized 
standard, if the risk is described there. If the risk differs 
from the harmonized standard, then risk estimation 
and evaluation need to be done and documented 
carefully. Support to risk evaluation and reduction 
(safety measures) can be found in the safety design 
process for collaborative robots (Fig. 4). In addition, the 
safety measure can be selected by applying, for 
example, Machinery Directive (mandatory 
requirements), other standards and state-of-the-art 
knowledge. Arguments are needed to prove the 
solution, which is not according to the relevant 
harmonized standard.  
Here in the collaborative robot design model risks 
are related to impact, clamping, shearing and stabbing. 
Other risks are considered by applying robot safety 
standards (ISO 10218-1 and ISO 10218-2). Risk 
reduction is made first by removing risk by applying 
inherently safe design, secondly by safeguarding and 
thirdly informing user about the risks [10]. The 
inherently safe design means, usually, selecting and 
using so small collaborative robots that they cannot 
hurt human. Robot selection is not here part of the 
process, but it is made before the collaborative robot 
design process (Fig. 4). The safety design process for 
collaborative robots is related mainly to safeguarding, 
which includes safety function evaluation and control 
and limitation of power, force, speed, stopping and 
area, which can be associated to Fig. 5 and phase 6 of 
Fig. 4. External safety devices are related to phase 3 and 
additional measures like enabling devices to phase 5 of 
Fig. 4 and Fig. 7.  
 
Fig. 3. Safety design process according to ISO 12100. 
[10] 
 
Fig. 4 describes safety process for helping risk 
evaluation and reduction i.e. selecting safety measures. 
Fig. 5 presents the safety process related to internal 
safety functions. Light green means question and the 
track branches to two tracks (Yes/No). Light blue colour 
refers to action and other colours refer to specific 
colour coded phases. Here are explanations to the 
numbers/phases related to the figures: 
1. Beginning of the process. There is a collaborative 
robot, with safety functions i.e. robot for the 
application is already selected. In addition, risk 
analysis is already made for the robot cell. First, 
consider impact to the head and are there sharp 
edges or tools, which cause hazards. 
2. Do the safety functions fulfil the ISO 10218-2 
section 5.2.2 requirements (PL d and Cat 3)? 
3. If internal safety functions are not adequate, then 
apply external safety devices. These can be 
related to e.g. dynamic safety system, external 
tactile sensors, external safety-rated monitored 
stop or area restrictions and isolation (see Fig. 6).  
4. Use PL assignment (risk assessment) for the 
application to see, if it gives lower requirement 
than PL d (see Fig. 8). 
5. Can additional measures justify e.g. PL d, Cat 2. 
After phase 5 return, back to previous question, 
and furthermore to relevant phase (see Fig. 7).  
6. Internal safety functions can be applied, if they 
fulfil safety requirements. Internal safety 
functions are related to e.g. impact forces, 
restricted area, speed or safety-rated monitored 
stop (see Fig. 5). 
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Fig. 4. Basic safety process for collaborative robots to 
select safety measures. 
Fig. 5 shows the situation when Fig. 4 process leads to 
phase 6, which is related to internal safety functions.  
 
Fig. 5. Safety process for collaborative robots related to 
mainly internal safety functions (phase 6). 
Fig. 6 shows external measures, which can be used to 
ensure safety. It is associated to phase 3 of Fig. 4. The 
measures can be valid also for industrial robots, except 
for external tactile sensors. Separation distance 
monitoring requires typically safety system, which 
monitors both robot and human movements, with 
adequate safety measures. An example of safety 
system is VTT dynamic safety system [12, 13]. Isolation 
of the robot restricted space is typical means for 
industrial robots and it provide only limited 
collaboration between human and the robot. 
 
Fig. 6. External safety measures for the robot (phase 3).  
Fig. 7 describes additional measures to reduce risk in 
order to decrease safety requirement level for the 
primary safety function. This phase is applicable only if 
the risk reduction need is small. In this phase, electronic 
safety functions are not applied, since PL is defined 
before safety functions can be applied. If safety 
functions are applied in this phase, they need to fulfil 
safety requirements of ISO 10218-2 (PL d and Cat. 3). 
Enabling device must fulfil the requirements stated at 
ISO 10218-1 [9].  
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Fig. 7. External safety measures for the robot (phase 5).  
Usually, the PLs of ISO 10218-2 are applied for safety 
functions. They are valid for typical robot applications. 
However, in some applications, the risks can be 
different and the PLs need to be reassigned. In practice, 
it means that severity is low and the robot cannot hurt 
a person. In phase 4, some severe risks are already 
ruled out and they are dealt at phase 3. Phase 4 is 
described at Fig. 8. In this phase the risk graph of ISO 
13849-1 is applied to assign the PL. It would be possible 
to apply other functional safety standards in assigning 
PL or SIL, but apparently, ISO 13849-1 is here the most 
applicable. In some cases, there are other machinery 
standards, which gives performance level for specific 
safety functions (e.g. stability), but then one should 
consider how well they are applicable for the robots. 
After phase 4 one need to return back to phase 2.  
 
Fig. 8. Assign performance level (PL) (phase 4).  
 
6 Discussion 
It was mentioned already at the introduction that risk 
assessment is difficult for cobots, since close 
collaboration between human and robot is expected. It 
is relatively straightforward to isolate a system, but 
when safety-rated monitored stop or separation 
distance is applied, then also functional safety 
requirements are essentially relevant. When power and 
force limitation is applied, then, in addition, 
measurements or calculation models are needed to 
validate the applied impact force limits.  
The stopping performance of the cobot is complex 
and, therefore, simple force limits of the robot 
controller do not give accurate results. According to 
Braman, power and force limiting is the main form of 
collaboration [14] and therefore it is important to 
consider the force limits. Currently the ISO TS 15066 
provides force/pressure limits to validate cobot 
application. However, many aspects affect the 
measurement results and the measurement conditions 
are not yet defined in standards. The force limits face, 
currently, several problems: what is the right force limit 
for each body part, how do persons feel the impact 
force (sensitive vs. robust persons), how to measure 
the force, how the robot manufacturers can realize 
exact force limits in all situations. Same and, actually, 
more difficult problems are related to pressure limits. 
The cobots can be placed also on a mobile platform 
and then they are mobile robots. Mobile robots can be 
also without additional robot on a mobile 
platform/robot. There are not yet standards for the 
safety of mobile robots and therefore the requirements 
need to be found from other standards, Machinery 
Directive and risk assessment. The amount of risks is 
typically larger for mobile robots than cobots, since 
mobile robots can be applied in many places during one 
work cycle. 
One specific problem is related to impact to the 
head. According to ISO TS 15066 impact to head or 
sensitive body regions shall be prevented whenever 
reasonably practicable [7]. In most of the applications 
human could stick his head into dangerous impact 
position - The question is: What is reasonably 
practicable head impact prevention.  
Apparently, the cobots are developing and some 
current issues may be solved in the near future. 
Currently functional safety level is not adequate for 
many robots, but in the near future inherently safe 
structures or adequate safety functions will solve the 
problem. The impact forces/pressures may be 
measured, with simple cheap device or expected 
impact forces could be simulated accurately. Currently, 
some cobots have long delays in stopping performance 
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and it cause long separation distance between human 
and robot. Long stopping time affect also impact forces. 
True collaboration between human and cobot require 
quick stopping, which is related to good brakes or 
motion control. Quick stopping may affect structure 
durability, cobot’s stability and load stability, and 
therefore the stopping performance needs to be 
optimized also in the future. 
Although cobots are often considered to be safe, risk 
assessment is required to ensure safety. Hazard 
identification is obligatory phase, but if the risk is 
similar to the risk described in harmonized standard, 
then the risk estimation and risk reduction can be 
adopted from a harmonized standard i.e., usually, ISO 
10218-2. All phases of the risk assessment need to be 
done, one way or another.  
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd. is 
developing in the NxtGenRob project the optimum 
ways to utilize next generation robotics in Finnish 
industry by developing solution models, design 
practices and (by evaluating) demonstrations from 
different perspectives. The main funder of the project 
is Business Finland Oy. In addition, seven companies 
have supported the project.  
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